Bakhtawar ALI

Judicial Capture

with Sultan Mehmood (R&R – The Economic Journal)

We use data from Pakistan to establish a reciprocal exchange relationship between the judiciary and government. We document large transfers in the form of expensive real estate from the government to the judiciary, and large favors in the form of pro-government rulings from the judiciary to the government. Our estimates indicate that the allocation of houses to judges increases pro-government rulings by 50% and reduces decisions on case merits by 30%. The allocation also incurs a cumulative cost of 0.03% of GDP to the government. However, it allows the government to expropriate additional land worth 0.2% of GDP in one year. The results suggest that such transfers within the state deteriorate the rule of law.

Travesty of Justice: Unintended Consequences of Anti-Corruption Campaigns

By Bakhtawar Ali

Typically, anti-corruption campaigns are believed to promote accountability, strengthen democracy, and establish the rule of law. However, this paper demonstrates how corruption efforts can be manipulated to persecute political opponents and consolidate the incumbent’s power. Through regression discontinuity design estimates, I show that opposition politicians charged with corruption in Pakistan’s Anti-Corruption (NAB) courts are more likely to be convicted if they narrowly win the election compared to if they narrowly lose. This targeting of opposition politicians seems to displace the prosecution of corruption cases against non-politicians. In courts that are particularly congested, corruption convictions of opposition politicians crowd-out corruption convictions of non-politicians.  In contrast, associates of the incumbent government who narrowly win the elections are less likely to be convicted. Analysis of mechanisms reveal that career concerns are likely important to explain these results. The judges who convict opposition politicians are more likely to be promoted. When the power to appoint and promote judges is taken away from the politicians, the career concerns mechanisms break down and the effect on convictions attenuates. The results cannot be explained by alternative mechanisms of judge selection or peer effects. Overall our findings underscore the need for caution when implementing anti-corruption campaigns. While such campaigns are typically viewed as a means to promote accountability, they can also be manipulated to target political opponents and maintain the government’s hold on power.

Altruistic Vaccination

with Jun Hyung Kim, Avner Seror, and Syngjoo Choi

We conducted a study on the altruistic motives behind vaccination intentions. Using data from a field experiment in Pakistan, we discovered that providing information about the probability of transmitting Covid-19 to others significantly increases vaccination intention. Subjects in our study responded more positively to a treatment that directed their attention to the potential loss experienced when they do not get vaccinated and infect others, compared to a treatment that focused on the gain experienced when they do get vaccinated and do not infect others. We explained these findings using a theoretical model that incorporates reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion. By utilizing this model, we estimated subjects’ loss aversion in the context of altruistic preferences to be between 2.2 and 2.9. In conclusion, our results indicate that loss aversion has an impact on altruistic preferences and can be utilized to enhance vaccination uptake.

Work in Progress

Reform Multiplier

with Sultan Mehmood

Abstract coming soon

Judges as Norm Enforcers

This paper aims to investigate the influence of religious leaders in upholding conservative social norms in Pakistan. By utilizing a distinctive dataset on family courts at the local level, we seek to demonstrate that districts with historically high shrine density exhibit a significant decrease in rulings favoring women when they unilaterally file for divorce. Moreover, we aim to establish a connection between the enforcement of conservative social norms, female labor force participation, and local economic development.

Wolf Guarding the Sheep: Regulatory Capture in Agricultural Markets

In this project, I hope to study how regulatory agencies may engage in monopoly pricing. We do this in context of Pakistan where we examine how politicians just winning elections and those just losing may impact price fixing behaviour in the agriculture markets in a Regression Discontinuity Design. I have complied a list of names of “sugar barrons”, these are politicians-cum-industrialists that both hold key regulatory offices as well as have large personal stakes in the sugar industry. I hope to match this with votes data from Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and examine how these politicians just winning elections impact local sugar prices, quantity produced and local economic development in the district.